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MORAL RIGHTS AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: PUTTING HONOR BEFORE
FREE SPEECH?
KATHRYN A. KELLY*
Great art is produced by men [and women] who feel acutely and
nobly; and it is in some sort an expression of this personal
feeling.'
Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely accord-
ing to conscience, above all liberties.
I. INTRODUCTION
Artists express themselves through their work. While provid-
ing beauty and wonder to those who enjoy their works, they give a
part of themselves to their audience. Artists' works reflect the indi-
* Judicial Law Clerk, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals; J.D. DePaul University Col-
lege of Law (1993); B.A. Saint Xavier College (1990). The author wishes to thank Professor
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall of the DePaul University College of Law for her encouragement,
and the DePaul University College of Law Library. The author also wishes to thank her
family.
1. JOHN RusKiN, MoDERN PAImNs III.iv.
2. John Milton, Areopagitica, A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the
Parliament of England (1644).
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vidual personalities of the creators. Has society, through its law-
making bodies, protected the artists, who give so much of them-
selves? Generally, artists have been protected economically in de-
veloped countries. However, artists' needs extend beyond econom-
ics. Artists' reputations and honor are also at stake whenever they
submit their work for public inspection.
Some countries do protect artists' reputation and honor,
others are just realizing their obligation to protect artists' rights,
and still others have not yet taken steps to secure these rights.
"Moral rights" is the name given in this country to a bundle of
rights protecting the honor and reputation of artists. These rights
include the right of integrity, attribution, disclosure, and with-
drawal. They are rights "[w]hich are personal to the authors, and
as such, viable, separate, and apart from the proprietary aspects of
copyright."' Most of the Western European countries have recog-
nized moral rights protection, especially France, Germany, and
Italy.
With the enactment of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(VARA),4 the United States has finally recognized moral rights ex-
plicitly.5 The VARA became effective in 1991 as part of the copy-
right statute, and with it, visual artists acquired some additional
protection not provided by copyright law. Although limited, the
protection afforded these artists has extended the economic rights
provided by traditional copyright law to include the protection of
the reputation and honor of the artist.
In some ways, the copyright statute protects the value of free
speech, as expressed by authors and creators.' By encouraging cre-
ation, and protecting the product of that creation, the First
Amendment is promoted. The copyright clause of the Constitution
states that Congress shall have the power "[t]o promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their respective
Writings and Discoveries. ' 7 The First Amendment protects the
3. MELViLLE NimmxR & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, at 8.211A] (1991).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. 1992). See infra notes 49-93 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the enactment of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990).
5. See infra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing other legal doctrines used to
support a cause of action for harm to an artist's reputation).
6. "In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers in-
tended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable
right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
[Vol. 11:211
2
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 2
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol11/iss2/2
MORAL RIGHTS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
creator's right to communicate by prohibiting Congress from
abridging an individual's freedom of speech. However, the First
Amendment protects the freedom of speech of individuals other
than authors and creators, namely the "beholders" of art and the
public generally. While artists are free to create, others are free to
comment, criticize, and convey their ideas in words and expressive
acts.'
Given the new protection granted to visual artists via section
106A, the statutory VARA, a question of the constitutional rights
of beholders is raised. Do these new moral rights impinge upon the
First Amendment rights of others? Is it permissible to restrict the
constitutional freedoms of those who comment or engage in sym-
bolic speech? The purpose of this article is to explore this poten-
tial clash of constitutional rights.
In order to understand the conflict between section 106A and
the First Amendment, several hypotheticals will be used through-
out the article. Hypothetical #1 involves a limited edition painting,
signed and numbered by the artist. The painting depicts a semi-
nude woman. The painting is owned by a radical feminist who be-
lieves the painting is degrading to women. She includes the paint-
ing in a display of what she depicts as pornography at a women's
awareness center. She hangs the painting with pictures from
magazines such as Playboy and Penthouse. The artist is offended
by the display of the painting in this context.
Hypothetical 42 involves one of many advertisements made
from a painting. The painting itself is included in an exhibit at a
local museum, and the museum photographed the painting for use
with its advertisement of the exhibit. An art critic/historian from a
newspaper reviews this painting, stating that it is a copy of an ob-
scure Italian artist who created in the 1700s, particularly pointing
to the horizontal brushstroke and subject matter. The review
harshly criticizes the creator, accusing the artist of plagiarism. On
a television program, the critic tears up the advertisement in pro-
test.' The artist claims not to know of the Italian artist, objects to
the destruction of the advertisement and asserts she created the
painting from her original ideas.
The art at issue in hypothetical #3 is a mural painted on a
8. See infra notes 113-23 and accompanying text (exploring the First Amendment pro-
tection built into the Copyright Statute).
9. Interestingly, during the NEA debates, Senator Alphonse D'Amato, protesting An-
dres Serrano's photograph "Piss Christ," dramatically ripped up a copy of the exhibition
catalogue that contained Serrano's photo. Carole S. Vance, The War on Culture in CENSOR-
sHIP 190 (Robert E. Long, ed. 1990).
19941
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building. The mural contains patriotic themes, and includes an
American flag, the seal of the United States, and the monuments
of the United States capital. An angry young man, protesting the
tax increase and the American involvement in the Middle East,
sprays permanent red paint over part of the mural. The artist is
shocked at the mutilation of her work, and disclaims it.
The subject of hypothetical #4 is a documentary movie by a
young film student. He portrays the plight of the homeless by in-
terviewing homeless persons and observing their lives for a week. A
large studio buys the documentary and edits it slightly, but it is
still clearly based upon the student's work. The student believes
that the editing detracts from the realism of the film and under-
mines his intended stark and choppy style.
In order to understand the interplay between moral rights and
the First Amendment, both doctrines must be examined individu-
ally. Part II of this article examines the moral rights doctrine, 10
and the various rights protected by it. The history of the moral
rights doctrine will be outlined, in addition to Article 6bi, of the
Berne Convention, recently ratified by the United States. Next,
this part will explore the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, includ-
ing its provisions and legislative history.
Part III of this article reviews First Amendment doctrine.1
First, it discusses the general purposes of the First Amendment.
Next, it examines the balancing of free expression and other rights,
and the scope of these freedoms. The section then explores specific
doctrines such as prior restraint, the overbreadth doctrine, and the
O'Brien test, addressing speech combined with action. Part IV of
this article applies these First Amendment doctrines to situations
involving moral rights to determine whether moral rights protec-
tion infringe upon First Amendment protection.' 2 Both the United
States' VARA and other extensive moral rights protection afforded
artists may conflict with the First Amendment's edict that Con-
gress will make no law abridging the freedom of speech. As a fun-
damental right, the First Amendment should supersede less impor-
tant rights that impinge upon it. However, the problem is not so
clear-cut. The U.S. Constitution also explicitly states that the fur-
therance of creative arts should be encouraged. Therefore, the two
competing interests must be balanced.
This article concludes that moral rights protection under sec-
10. See infra notes 13-93 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 95-158 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 159-173 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 11:211
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tion 106A can indeed infringe upon the First Amendment rights of
beholders. While Congress determined that an artist's reputation
and honor are important societal concerns, the First Amendment
prohibition seems to have been ignored. The statute may be over-
and under-inclusive, void for vagueness, and overbroad. Because
the goal of this article is to expose the inherent conflict between
the moral rights and the First Amendment, this article does not
suggest a perfect solution to the conflict. Courts may be able to
resolve such challenges with a definitional balancing approach if
judges find the statute itself is constitutional.
II. MORAL RIGHTS
Since 1909, with the enactment of the copyright statute,
United States law has recognized artists' economic rights. 3 The
copyright statute protects "original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression." 4 The objective of copyright
law is to protect the copyright owner's economic interests. Artists
are often in an economically weaker position than purchasers and
licensees of their artwork. They usually do not own the copyright
or the work, and therefore are left with no rights after the sale of
their work. Because of this powerless position, a concern for addi-
tional artists' rights evolved.
The concern for artists' and copyright owners' economic rights
acts in concert with the government's goal to encourage creation
and preservation of artistic works and to foster growth in the artis-
tic community. One step further on the spectrum of an artist's
rights is moral rights protection. The doctrine of moral rights ad-
dresses the concern that once a work and the accompanying copy-
right are sold, the creator, although compensated, loses all rights as
to the work. 5 The effect of this loss could be the damage of the
13. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The statute has been revised many times. The most signifi-
cant revisions occurred in 1976. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541
(1976).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). Works of authorship include: literary works; musical
works; dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic and sculp-
tural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and sound recordings. Id. The
visual arts definition is not synonymous with any other definition in the Copyright Act, and
is narrower than the scope of copyright protection. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
11 (1990) [hereinafter Report].
15. The authors "claiming the moral right typically no longer own the work itself or
the copyright. The claim is thus based on a different, inherent right inhering in authorship
itself." ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADE-
MARKS AND COPYRIGHT 421 (1990). See also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and Moral
Right: Is an American Marriage Possible? 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985) (exploring the inclusion
19941
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artist's honor or reputation. The doctrine of "droit moral," or
moral rights, 16 protects the personality and reputation of the cre-
ators of art work, even after the work and/or copyright are sold.
A. The Bundle of Rights
Moral rights are a bundle of rights, as in real property, but
rather than protecting the economic rights of creators, as in copy-
right, moral rights protect the reputation and honor of the artist.
17
These rights developed in Europe, flowering about the time of the
French Revolution.18 The "bundle" of moral rights includes the
right of disclosure, the right of attribution, the right of integrity,
and the right of withdrawal. Each right protects a different aspect
of the intellectual property produced by an artist, and each pre-
serves the reputation or personality of the artist.
1. The Right of Disclosure
The right of disclosure' 9 gives the creator the right to control
the publication of his or her works. The creator can make the ulti-
mate decision as to whether a work is complete and whether it
should be made public. The artist retains the right to modify, de-
stroy or hide the work.2 0 This right permits an artist to refuse to
of moral rights into copyright law).
16. See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Art-
ists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1940); John H. Merryman, The Refrigera-
tor of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023 (1976). In Germany the doctrine is known as
Uhrheberpersonlichkeitsrecht.
17. "These rights are grounded in the intellectual and moral investments an artist
makes in a work of art, and he retains them even after his bundle of property rights in the
work are transacted away." A. BRADLEY SHINGLETON ET AL., ARTISTS' MORAL RIGHTS IN
THEIR WORKS OF ART: AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY 2 (1985).
18. See also I JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS & THE VISUAL
ARTS 142.(2d ed. 1987) (discussing Greek artists signing sculptures and medieval guilds'
recognition of artists' rights); Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of
Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. Comp. L. 465 (1968). France has always
been on the vanguard of moral rights recognition. Since the Middle Ages, France has devel-
oped and honed the bundle of rights that comprise the "droit moral." Finally codified in
1957, in the Law on Literary and Artistic Property (protecting both economic and moral
rights of the artist), France recognizes all the moral rights in some way.
The rights of paternity and integrity are perpetual in France, passed to the artist's heirs
or a third party. Although the French law declares moral rights to be inalienable and unas-
signable, there are many exceptions. For an overview of moral rights history, see Jody A.
Van Den Heuvel, Moral Rights for Artists: The Development of a Federal Policy, 19 J. ART.
MGMT. L. 8 (1989).
19. This right also is known as droit de divulgation in France.
20. The destruction of paintings, picturaphagie, recurs throughout the history of art.
MOSHE CARMILLY-WEINBERGER, FEAR OF ART: CENSORSHIP AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN
[Vol. 11:211
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complete a commissioned work. 21 The creator also may prohibit
the display of a work that he or she has already destroyed or
discarded.22
2. The Right of Attribution
The right of attribution,25 or paternity, allows the creator to
have his or her authorship recognized, even if the artist has sold or
transferred the work. The right encompasses three distinct, but re-
lated, rights. First, an author may require that his or her name be
used with any work of his or her authorship. 24 This includes a
pseudonym, or nom de plume. Additionally, the artist has the right
to prohibit use of his or her name with a work the artist did not
create.2 5 Finally, the author may disclaim authorship if the work is
altered to such an extent as to not be considered the work of the
creator. This third part of the right of attribution overlaps with
the right of integrity, discussed below. The right of integrity pro-
ART 190 (1986). In the search for satisfaction and perfection, artists may lose patience and
destroy their "finished" works. Id. at 191. "The artist, perhaps more than most people, has
the indispensable sensitivity needed for artistic creativity." Id. at 193. In fact, artists feel a
moral obligation to express truth and to criticize society. Id. at 195. Artists also fear nega-
tive criticism, and some have destroyed their works after being criticized. Id. at 196.
21. The artist is responsible for any damages as a result of this breach of contract, but
not for specific performance.
22. See Eden v. Whistler, (1900) (D.P.) I. 497, (1900) Recueil Sirey (S. Jur.) I. 490
(Cass. civ.). In Whistler, James McNeil Whistler, an American artist, was commissioned to
paint a portrait of Lady Eden. The portrait was exhibited, but because the artist was dissat-
isfied with his fee and claimed that he was not satisfied with his work, he painted over Lady
Eden's head. The Court de Cassation held that Whistler could not be compelled to deliver
the work, although he would be liable for the fee paid to him and damages for breach of
contract. The court held that "until the artist has put the painting at the party's disposal
and the party has accepted it. . . the painter remains the master of his work." Id.
23. This right is also known as droit a la paternite. In Guille v. Colmant, Cour d'appel
Paris, 1967 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey [D.S. Jur.] 284, Guille, a painter, contracted with an art
dealer who required that the artist's work be created under a pseudonym. The court stated
that the dealer could not deprive the artist of the use of his real name. But see Vargas v.
Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947) (holding that absent an express agreement to
attribute photographs to the author a magazine could claim authorship).
24. In Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981), a court held for an actor whose
name was deleted in the film's credits, instead using another actor's name. This belief in
giving credit to the creator has been expressed numerous time, including by Picasso where
he wrote that the canvas has no value without the creator's signature: "Les toiles n'ont
aucune valeur, tant qu'elles ne sont pas signees chacun peut faire autant." Sanctis, V.D. Il
Carattere creativo delle Opere dell'ingeno. Milan:150, quoted by E. Reeves.
25. See Geisel v. Poynter Prods., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding that the
plaintiff, also known as Dr. Suess, had the right to prohibit the use of his name on a work he
did not create); Clemens v. Press Pub. Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206 (Sup. Ct. 1910) (holding that an
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tects a work from distortion or mutilation and the right of attribu-
tion extends that right to allow an author the ability to disclaim
authorship of a work that has been altered.
3. The Right of Integrity
At the core of the moral rights doctrine is the right of integ-
rity, 6 preventing the intentional distortion, mutilation or modifi-
cation of works of art once they have been presented to the public.
The spirit of the author's work is thus protected, and any modifi-
cation may be actionable.2 " It should be noted that many commen-
26. This right, droit au respect de I'oeuvre, is central to moral rights. See Buffet, Cour
d'appel Paris, Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.] 570.
Two cases decided before moral rights recognition in the U.S. exemplify artists' struggle
to protect the integrity of their work. See Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89
N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949). In 1937, Rutgers Presbyterian Church invited artists from the
National Society of Mural Painters to design and execute a mural for their Manhattan
Church. Through a competition, the Church's committee selected the application of Alfred
D. Crimi. Crimi executed a fresco mural painting 26 feet wide by 365 feet high. Some of the
church members objected to the mural, specifically to the portrayal of Christ with much of
his chest bare. In 1946, the mural was painted over without notice to Crimi, and he sued.
The court held for the church, finding that moral rights of artists are "not supported by the
decisions of our courts." Crimi, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
In Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948),
aff'd 87 N.Y.S.2d 2430 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949), defendant Twentieth Century-Fox produced a
movie, "The Iron Curtain," depicting Soviet espionage and containing anti-Soviet themes.
The defendant used the music of Soviet composers as background music and used the plain-
tiffs' names in the credits. The music was in the public domain. Plaintiffs sued to enjoin use
of their music or names, claiming the use constituted approval of the film's themes. The
court held for defendants, finding plaintiff's libel and intentional infliction claims were
insufficient.
In another pre-VARA case, a court eked out protection of artists' rights. In Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d. Cir. 1976), plaintiffs, British writers and per-
formers known as Monty Python, wrote scripts for submission to the BBC. The BBC had
the right to make changes, but the parties adhered to a detailed agreement as to alteration
procedure. The agreement did not allow alteration of the program once it had been re-
corded. Plaintiffs had turned down ABC's request to broadcast the show because they be-
lieved that the disjoined format (i.e., use of commercials) was unacceptable. ABC acquired
rights to the series, and in 1975 broadcast two 90-minute specials, each comprising three 30-
minute Monty Python programs. Plaintiffs objected to "the discontinuity and mutilation
that had resulted from the editing . . . " Id. The court opined that "the copyright law
should be used to recognize the important role of the artist in our society and the need to
encourage production and dissemination of artistic works by providing adequate legal pro-
tection for one who submits his work to the public." Id.
27. For example, in 1955, French artist Bernard Buffet painted a work on six panels of
a refrigerator, signing the work only once. See Merryman, supra note 16 and accompanying
text. The work was auctioned off for charity, later dismantled, and a single panel was put on
the market six months later. In a French court, Buffet was able to enjoin the sale by arguing
that his moral rights were violated. Id. See also Society of Survivors of the Riga Ghetto v.
Huttenbach, 535 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1988) ([A]lthough there is no moral rights doctrine
expressly recognized in the copyright law, custom and usage limit a publisher's right to edit
[Vol. 11:211
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tators do not believe that total destruction of a creation constitutes
a violation of this right.2 This right also protects the public's right
to behold the work as the creator intended.
4. The Right of Withdrawal
The right of withdrawal 9 allows the creator to withdraw, mod-
ify or disavow a work after it has been published. The creator is
able to withdraw a work if he or she is dissatisfied with it, or for
any other reason. This right may be problematic after a work has
been disseminated widely, but the creator may demand a work's
removal from the public. This "stick" in the bundle of moral rights
usually receives limited protection.3"
5. Other Rights
There are several other rights that have been asserted to be
included in the bundle of moral rights. The right to protection
from excessive criticism is one such right. Because moral rights
protect a creator's reputation, this right shields an artist from un-
necessarily harsh criticism that may damage his or her reputation.
and change a manuscript to reasonable modifications only.); Paramount Pictures Corp. v.
Video Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 724 F. Supp. 808 (D. Kan. 1989) (assessing a moral rights
claim under copyright and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act).
In 1980, the Bank of Tokyo removed a sculpture by American artist Isamu Noguchi
from its Wall Street branch. The Bank cut the 1600 pound "Shinto" into pieces to remove
it. The artist was not notified, and he had no legal recourse. Grace Gleuck, Bank Cuts Up
Noguchi Sculpture and Stores It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1980 § 1, at 1; Grace (leuck, Art
People, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1982 at C29.
28. Merryman, supra note 16. Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990: Toward A Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for the Artists, 19 CATH. L.
REV. 945, 971 n.141 (1990) ("In the case of complete destruction, there arguably can be no
injury to the author's reputation because, unlike the case of a mutilated work where a
viewer might form a bad impression of the author from the work, the work does not exist.");
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 15.24.1 (1989) (reasoning that a work's de-
struction will not injure an author's reputation); Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personal-
ity: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV.
1, 9 (1988) (disclosing that until 1975, French law was unclear about the right against com-
plete destruction).
29. France's droit de retrait ou de repentir or modific is not widely accepted. As ex-
plained by Professor Goldstein, in the countries that recognize such a right, it is ineffective.
Goldstein, supra note 28, at § 15.24.4. See also Autry v. Republic Prods., 213 F.2d 667, 670
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 858 (1954) (holding that a grant of rights supersedes an
unfair competition action).
30. It is very difficult to withdraw works that have been disseminated in multiple cop-
ies. Books, for example, would be next to impossible to withdraw because they are easy to
copy and can be privately owned. Also, this right would take away full ownership rights
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A similarly related doctrine is the prohibition against any other
attacks on the personality of the creator.31 Although, these rights
are not widely accepted, they are, in essence, protected as are other
sticks in the bundle of moral rights. 2
B. The Berne Convention and Article 6bis
Two of the rights discussed above were first recognized in the
international legal community in 1886. One of the first interna-
tional treaties, the Berne Convention of 1886, primarily discussed
copyright laws protecting economic rights.3 s However, the Berne
Convention included a moral rights article that specifically ad-
dressed the rights of attribution and integrity."' Although these
rights originated in ancient Greece and developed in Europe, the
Berne Convention finally established moral rights as a legal
doctrine.
Because of requirements such as notice and registration, the
United States has not, until recently, adhered to the Berne Con-
vention.3 5 On March 1, 1989, the United States became the eight-
31. Roeder, supra note 16.
32. Moral rights as a whole protect the honor and reputation of the artist. These addi-
tional rights merely state this explicitly, as the rights may be infringed by verbal acts.
33. BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., (I) (1986) (Treaty Doc. 99-27) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The Berne
Convention is the oldest and most important multilateral copyright treaty. Id. at (III) (let-
ter of submittal George P. Schultz). The Berne Convention's subject matter includes any
original work of authorship "in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be
the mode or form of its expression." U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CIRCU-
LAR 93A, THE UNITED STATES JOINS THE BERNE UNION 5 (1989) [hereinafter Circular 93a].
These works include paintings, architecture, photographic works, illustrations, and "three-
dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture or science, as well as
books, dramatic works or dramatico-musical works, musical compositions, and cinemato-
graphic works." Id. In it, members pledge to maintain high levels of protection for the rights
of authors in their literary and artistic works. Berne Convention (III). The purpose of the
Berne Convention's rule of national treatment is to provide creators the same protection for
their works in other countries as the countries accord their own creators. Circular 93a at 5;
Berne Convention (III). See also Jon A. Baumgarten & Christopher A. Meyer, The United
States Joins the Berne Convention, 2 RIGHTS 1-4 (Winter 1988-89) (discussing changes to
the political and substantive complexion of U.S. copyrights).
34. Berne Convention, supra note 33, art. 6bis.
35. Professor Nimmer includes pressure by the television and film industries in the list
of reasons behind the U.S. non-participation in the Berne Convention. Melville B. Nimmer,
Implications of the Prospective Revision of the Berne Convention and the United States
Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499, 524 (1967).
As to registration, the Berne Convention extends U.S. copyright law by exempting from
registration Berne Convention works that did not originate in the U.S. Circular 93a, supra
note 33, at 3. The Convention abolished mandatory copyright notice for all works first pub-
lished on or after March 1, 1989. Id. at 4. However, voluntary use of notice is encouraged.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LmRARY OF CONGRESS, CIRCULAR 93, HIGHLIGHTS OF U.S. ADHERENCE
[Vol. 11:211
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ieth member of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Liter-
ary and Artistic Works,3 6 joining every country of the European
Economic Community in their membership to the Berne Conven-
tion.3 7 As a result of the United States' adherence to the Berne
Convention, only the former Soviet Union and China remained as
nonsignatories of the Convention. 8
After Congress decided to join the Berne Union, the next
question was whether the Convention was self-executing, that is,
automatically effective law in the United States. If the Convention
was indeed self-executing, Congress need only ratify the' treaty to
make its provisions part of United States copyright law.39 If the
Convention was not self-executing, legislation would be required in
order to bring U.S. law into compliance with the Berne require-
ments.' 0 The laws of the country ratifying the Convention dictate
this decision." Ultimately, Congress determined that the treaty
was not self-executing and that implementing legislation would be
needed.'2
TO THE BERNE CONVENTION 2 (1989) [hereinafter Circular 93]. The United States was a sig-
natory to the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC), which came into force in 1955. Uni-
versal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952; (revised at Paris, July 24, 1971). "Because the
Convention minima are explicit and substantial, the level of assured protection is higher
than that afforded by the Universal Copyright Convention." Berne Convention, (letter of
submittal) supra note 33 at (III). See also Leonard D. DuBoff et al., Out of UNESCO, 4
CARDozo ART & ENT. L.J. 203, 204, 208 (1985) (urging U.S. membership in the Berne union);
Nimmer, supra at 499-52 (advocating adherence to the Berne Convention). The 79 member
countries to the Berne Convention provide copyright protection to citizens of other member
,countries. Circular 93a, supra note 33 at 2. Indicative of its diversity, both developing and
developed nations are members to the Convention. Id.
36. Circular 93a, supra note 33, at 2. In his letter of transmittal, President Reagan
stated that "[w]hen we are urging other countries to enhance copyright protection, the
United States can no longer remain outside the Berne Union. It is, therefore, a matter of
some urgency that the United States finally join the Berne Convention." Berne Convention,
supra note 33, at (II). "The fundamental principle of the Berne Convention is protection
based upon national treatment." See also Circular 93a, supra note 33, at 2 (noting that an
Ad Hoc Committee of the Department of State examined ratification and submitted find-
ings in 1985).
37. Circular 93a, supra note 33, at 2.
38. Id. Professor Nimmer noted that the United States joined Berne primarily for the
sake of moral leadership in the world copyright community. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.21[A] (1992).
39. Nimmer, supra note 38 § 1.12[A].
40. Circular 93a, supra note 33 at 2.
41. Id.
42. The House Committee stated "unequivocally that Berne is not self-executing, that
domestic law is not in any way altered except through the implementing legislation itself,
and that the implementing legislation is absolutely neutral on the issue of the rights of
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The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 4 (the
BCIA), the enabling legislation for U.S. adherence to the Berne
Convention, was the result of much debate. Factions on both
sides of the legislative issue reached a consensus on two main
objectives: first, to use a minimalist approach and amend the U.S.
Copyright Act only where there was a clear conflict; and second, to
amend the law only as much as necessary to resolve the conflict.
4 5
One specific provision of the Berne Convention, Article 6bis,
protects moral rights .4 This provision caused an especially exten-
sive debate in Congress when it considered the BCIA. The rights of
paternity and integrity were included in the Berne Convention in
Article 6bis and Congress determined that current law, such as un-
fair competition law and state and common law protection, was
sufficient for the protection of moral rights.'7 Therefore, the Imple-
mentation Act did not include a moral rights provision, and the
U.S. did not recognize moral rights explicitly.
8
43. P.L. 100-568, 702 Stat. 2853 (October 31, 1988). See also Deborah Ross, Comment,
The United States Joins the Berne Convention: New Obligations for Authors' Moral
Rights? 68 N.C.L. REV. 363 (1990) (proposing legislation guaranteeing author's moral
rights).
44. See Nimmer, supra note 38, § 8.21[A][2][a].
45. Circular 93a, supra note 33, at 2.
46.
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of
the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work
and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor and reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph
shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiration of the eco-
nomic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized
by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed. However, those
countries whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or accession to
this Act, does not provide for the protection after the death of the author of all
the rights set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these
rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall
be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
Berne Convention, Paris Act, 1971.
47. Circular 93a, supra note 33, at 3. See also M. Marian Clough, Legal Protection for
the Moral Rights: A Growing Trend in State Legislation, 36 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP)
99-105 (discussing other causes of action available to the artist, including copyright, libel,
privacy, breach of contract, and unfair competition); Yvonne Linsert Morse, Freedom of the
Visual Arts: The Role of Governments in AN INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM PRIMER 103-29
(Charles N. Busha, ed. 1977); Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law
Basis for the Protection of Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REv. 97 (1986).
48. See Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 589 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J. concurring) (ex-
ploring the rejection by American courts of the term "moral rights"). See also Deborah
Ross, Comment, The United States Joins the Berne Convention: New Obligations for Au-
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C. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990"
Art lovers argue that the visual arts enrich society. "A work of
art is a form created by the artist out of human experience. At the
same time, it has a cultural context. It exists in time, and its form
reflects the forces of that time - social, economic, political and
religious."' 0 Moral rights go beyond the link between society and
art (the public good) to address the relationship between the artist
and his or her work.61
Separate legislation had been introduced in Congress since
1979 to explicitly recognize moral rights.62 Senator Edward Ken-
nedy (D. Mass.) introduced the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987
(VARA of 1987) 51 several years before the Berne Convention was
thors' Moral Rights? 68 N.C.L. REV. 363 (1990) (proposing legislation guaranteeing authors'
moral rights).
49. The VARA was part of the Federal Judgeship Act of 1990 passed as the 101st
session neared adjournment. See Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990); Allan
Parachini, For Artists, A Measure of Protection, WASH. POST Nov. 7, 1990 at D9.
The colorization of films has been at the forefront of moral rights publicity. The VARA
specifically excludes motion pictures from its protection, but other countries protect the film
maker in these circumstances. Film makers assert that the unconsented colorization of black
and white films violates their right of integrity. Artists also object to time compression or
expansion and "pan and scan." See Film Labeling Legislation is Debated Before Senate
Subcommittee, DAILY RP'rs. ExEc. (BNA) (Sept. 23, 1992) (discussing legislation that would
require altered films to be so labeled); Jeffrey L. Graubart, U.S. Moral Rights: Fact or Fic-
tion? N.Y.L.J. 5 (Aug. 7, 1992) (relating the French case reviewing THE ASPHALT JUNGLE
colorization); Daniel McKendree Sessa, Note, Moral Right Protection in the Colorization of
Black and White Motion Pictures: A Black and White Issue, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 503
(1988); Elise K. Bader, A Film of a Different Color: Copyright and the Colorization of
Black and White Films, 5 CARDOZO ART & ENT. L.J. 497 (1986).
Because the VARA only became effective July 1, 1991, few cases have been decided
under section 106A. See Gegenhuber v. Hystopolis Productions Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10156 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (finding the defendants improperly removed the case from state court,
as the plaintiff's claims did not arise under copyright law, and 106A did not preempt the
action).
50. 136 CONG. REc H3113 (June 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Markey, quoting Helen
Gardner).
51. "A work of art is not a utilitarian object like a toaster. It is an intellectual work
like a song, a novel, or a poem. We must not permit the connection between the artist and
his or her work to be severed the first time the work is sold." 136 CONG. REc. H3115 (daily
ed. June 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Markey).
52. See S. 3221, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. E3425 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987);
S. 1619 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S11470 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1987); S. 2796, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. S12185 (Sept. 9, 1986); H.R. 5722, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 1323
CONG. REC. E3682 (Oct. 16, 1986); H.R. 1521, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H578-
579 (Feb. 17, 1983); H.R. 2908, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H5689 (1981); H.R.
288, 96th Cong. 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H440 (1979); H.R. 8261, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 124
CONG. REc. H22,733 (1977).
53. See Hearing on H.R. 3221, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 9, 1988). The 1988 legisla-
tion provided the author with the right, during his or her life, to claim or disclaim author-
ship because of any distortion, mutilation, or other alteration thereof. Id. at 5.
1994]
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ratified by the United States. In a modified format, the VARA was
again introduced in Congress in 1989 by Senators Kennedy and
Kasten in the Senate and by Representatives Markey and Berman
in the House. This legislation ultimately became the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990. 54 Despite the determination under the BCIA
that moral rights were sufficiently protected in the United States,
the passage of the Berne Convention was a catalyst for this federal
moral rights legislation.
5 5
The goal of the VARA is three-fold. First and foremost, the
legislation protects the honor and reputation of visual artists. Sec-
ond, the VARA attempts to protect the works of art themselves, as
the public interest in art might dictate. Finally, the legislation es-
tablishes a national standard for moral rights protection. 6
1. Scope
The scope of the legislation's protection is an important com-
ponent of the VARA. The rights afforded artists under the Act be-
long to the artist, regardless of who owns the work's copyright.
5 7
The VARA, as its name suggests, only protects visual arts58 includ-
ing paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and photographs.59
54. The VARA amends the copyright statute by adding section 106A, in addition to
related language and definitions. For a general overview of the VARA, see Laura W.
Wooton, Comment, Law for Law's Sake: the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 24 CONN. L.
REv. 247 (1991).
55. "The Visual Artists Rights Act harmonized U.S. law with the Berne Convention to
a greater degree." 57 Fed. Reg. 24659 (June 10, 1992).
56. 136 CONG. REc. H3113 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
57. "These moral rights do not derive from the artist's economic interests, and they
may not be traded, bartered, sold or otherwise handled in an economic transaction." Shin-
gleton, supra note 17, at 2.
If the artist cannot be found, no other party has standing to protect the work. Espe-
cially in the area of visual art on buildings, commentators suggest that public or private
non-profit organizations should be able to intervene to protect works of art. The provision
limiting standing to artists seems to contradict the three purposes of the VARA legislation
discussed above. First, the honor and reputation of the artist should be protected, be it by
the artist him or herself or by a designated organization. Second, the public's interest in
works of art would cut in favor of allowing specific non-profit organizations to step into the
shoes of the artist and protect the integrity of the work so the public can enjoy it. Finally,
because the national standard has been established, allowing these organizations to sue on
behalf of the artist does not affect the uniformity of the statute.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1993). Visual works are protected because they cannot be
physically transformed to meet different uses, and usually are limited edition originals, and
are irreplaceable. Report, supra note 14, at 9. "Protecting only works of visual art, let alone
defining works of visual art in such a narrow fashion, does not measure up to the concept of
moral rights embodied in article 6bis." Damich, supra note 28, at 953.
59. A work of visual art is:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited
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However, there are restrictions as to what forms of visual art are
protected. These works must be single copies or limited editions of
200 copies or fewer.60 Multiple copies must be signed and consecu-
tively numbered by the author. 1 Still photographic works must be
produced for exhibition. 2 Audio-visual works, works-for-hire, and
commissioned pieces are excluded from the statute.s
2. Rights Protected
The VARA protects two of the bundle of moral rights dis-
cussed above, those of attribution and integrity.64 The right of at-
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author, or, in case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculp-
tures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear
the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in
a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or
fewer that are signed by the author.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1993).
60. Id. The statute recognizes the special value inherent in the original or limited edi-
tion copy of a work. "The original or few copies with which the artist was most in contact
embody the artist's 'personality' far more closely than subsequent mass produced images."
Report, supra note 14, at 12 (quoting Professor Ginsburg).
61. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1993). Numbering and marking serves to limit the works
protected by the VARA. These requirements also provide notice to the buyer of the work's
protected status. Report, supra note 14, at 12.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1993). This clearly excludes commercial art from protec-
tion, as well as posters, maps, globes, charts, and technical drawings. Id. §§ 101, 102 (a)(5).
The VARA does not protect merchandising items, packaging, or advertising, works made for
hire, or any work not protectable by copyright law. This provision's requirement will pro-
vide notice, and further limits the VARA's protection. Report, supra note 15, at 12-13.
63. A work of visual art does not include:
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied
art, motion picture or other audio visual work, book, magazine, newspaper, peri-
odical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or simi-
lar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, cover-
ing, or packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1993).
See also Community for Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (determining whether a
work qualifies as a work made for hire. The Supreme Court listed nine factors for courts to
apply to a situation to determine whether the work is a work for hire.).
64. The author of a work of visual art
(1) shall have the right -
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work
of visual art which he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the
1994]
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tribution allows the artist to claim authorship of his or her work,
disclaim authorship of a work he or she did not create, and dis-
claim authorship of works that have been distorted so as to
prejudice the honor or reputation of the artist.6 Interestingly, Ar-
ticle 6bis of the Berne Convention provides only the first of these
three rights explicitly.6 Although the House version of the bill re-
quired that a violation of this right be committed intentionally or
negligently, the final version omitted the state of mind
requirement.
6 7
The VARA also grants the right of integrity to the artist. Sec-
tion 106A treats alterations and the destruction of a work a bit
differently. The law allows the artist to prevent the distortion, mu-
tilation or other modification of his or her work that is prejudicial
to his or her honor or reputation.6 8 In order to recover under this
right, intentional alteration must be proven and such alteration
must be prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation.69
The creator also has the right to prevent any destruction of a
work of recognized stature. Although not protected under 6bis of
the Berne Convention, any intentional or grossly negligent destruc-
tion of such a work violates that right.7 0 The right to prevent de-
work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification
of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (Supp. 1993). A violation of this right is remedied by an injunction.
Nimmer supra note 38, § 8.21[B].
65. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1) (Supp. 1993).
66. However, the World Intellectual Property Organization expanded this linear un-
derstanding to encompass a multi-level tier of rights. These include the rights to create and
publish psuedonymously or anonymously, to disclaim a work the artist did not create, and
to disclaim authorship if the work was altered to such a degree that the creator believes the
work is no longer his or her own. Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws: Hearings on S. 1198
Before the Subcomm. on Patents Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 149 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings]. The VARA does not
expressly include rights of anonymity and psuedonimity, but arguably extends to these
rights. See Nimmer supra note 38, § 8.21[B] n.127 (looking to the House Report and Berne
Convention for support).
67. 136 CONG. REc. H13313 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Brooks). See
Nimmer supra note 38, § 8.21[B] n.127 (comparing Berne protection with that of the
VARA).
68. The author of a work of visual art
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shall have the right -
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modifi-
cation of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification
of that work is a violation of that right.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (Supp. 1993).
69. Id.
70. The author of a work of visual art
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shall have the right-
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struction has an additional requirement not necessary to the right
to prevent alteration. The work for which the artist is seeking pro-
tection must be of recognized stature."1 The standard is not a re-
quirement under Berne, and this addition to section 106A differen-
tiates visual artists whose works arguably would be protected
under the section 101 definition of visual art.72 Encouraging such a
requirement, museums argue that they must be able to dispose of
works that do not "stand [the] test of time" or are abandoned. 78
The limitation excludes young artists not yet recognized and fore-
shadows a battle of the experts in trial as to who is an artist of
recognized stature.
3. Exceptions
There are certain exceptions to the VARA. The modification
of a work of visual art that is the result of preservation or aging is
not actionable under the Act. 74 The presentation, including light-
ing and placement, is not destruction, distortion or mutilation as
defined by the Act, unless it is caused by gross negligence. 5
4. Duration, Waiver & Remedies
Works of visual art created on or after the VARA's effective
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and
any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a vio-
lation of that right.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (Supp. 1993).
71. Id. No guidelines exist for this determination. "While generally limiting protected
works to irreplaceable ones may be a logical beginning for federal statutory protection of
moral rights, the limitation of the right against destruction to works 'of recognized stature'
is not easily rationalized from a moral rights standpoint." Damich, supra note 28, at 954.
Professor Damich also notes the inconsistency of requiring this standard to protect works
from destruction, but not to protect works from alteration. Id. He finds this standard
changes the VARA from moral rights protection to art preservation. Id.
72. See Hearings, supra note 66, at 136.
73. Id. at 137.
74.
(1) The modification of a work of visual art which is the result of the passage of
time or the inherent nature of the materials is not a distortion, mutilation, or
other modification described in subsection (a)(3)(A).
17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1) (Supp. 1993).
75.
(2) The modification of a work of visual art which is the result of conservation,
or of the public presentation, including lighting and placement, of the work is
not a destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification described in sub-
section (a)(3) unless the modification is caused by gross negligence.
17 U.S.C. § 106A (c)(2) (Supp. 1993). This is referred to as the museum exception, allowing
museums the discretion of how to display works.
1994]
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date7 are protected only for the life of the artist. Thus, the rights
of integrity and attribution provided by the VARA last only for
the artist's life. 77 Although earlier versions of section 106A pro-
vided protection for the life of the artist plus fifty years, the final
version of the bill excluded the additional years after the artists'
death.78 The duration limitation was added immediately before the
bill's passage. Earlier VARA versions mirrored copyright law
terms.
7 9
Generally, the rights provided under the VARA cannot be
transferred.80 However, the rights may be waived if the artist ex-
pressly agrees to the waiver in a written instrument signed by the
artist. 1 This instrument must identify specifically the work, and
the uses of that work, to which the waiver applies. For joint works,
a waiver of rights made by one artist waives the rights for all other
artists.82
76. June 1, 1991. 17 U.S.C. § 106A notes (Supp. 1993).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d). Other countries that recognize moral rights protect the crea-
tor's rights for the life of the creator plus 50 or 75 years. Also, several state statutes protect
a creator's moral rights for a period after his or her death. See infra note 90. The different
durations of protection creates part of the preemption problem between 106A and state
statutes.
78. The statute then would have mirrored copyright duration. Some countries recog-
nize moral rights perpetually, including France, Senegal, Benin, and Central African Repub-
lic. SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
WORKS: 1886-1986 474 (1987). In Germany, moral rights are protected for the life of the
author plus 70 years. Senate Hearings at 171. The duration of these rights in the United
Kingdom is the life of the author plus an additional 50 years. Id. In explaining France's
perpetual protection, it has been noted that by restricting the posthumous enforcement of
these rights to the artists' family and heirs, the law attempts to limit it to those persons who
could reasonably be expected to have the strongest interest in the matter. Shingleton, supra
note 17 at 3.
79. 136 CONG. REC. H13314 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). Unfortunately, this limitation
cuts against the asserted purpose of the VARA to protect art for the public to enjoy. For
example, the right of integrity expires with the death of the creator, thus allowing alteration
or destruction of the work. The public's interest in the work is lost, perhaps just when the
artist's contribution is being realized. Also, the VARA's goal of uniformity is lost, because
after the expiration of federally provided rights, state law protection is all that remains. See
Nimmer, supra note 38, § 8.21[B].
80. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (Supp 1993).
81. Id. The VARA directed the Copyright Office to oversee a five-year study as to the
artist's bargaining power and the effects of waiver. 17 U.S.C. § 106A note (Supp. 1993). See
also 57 Fed. Reg. 24659 (1992) (discussing the waiver provision, its legislative history, and
its impact).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. 1993). "The artist is better protected under a regime
requiring specificity of waivers than under one where an ideologically pure no-waiver law is
rarely in fact observed." Report, supra note 14, at 18.
Again, looking to the purposes of the VARA articulated by Congress, this result seems
inapposite. If the honor and reputation of the artist and the preservation of art are so im-
portant as to merit federal protection, why should one co-creator be able to authorize the
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The VARA remedies mirror those of the Copyright Act of
1990. Title 17 remedies, providing for injunctive relief, actual dam-
ages and statutory damages, costs, and attorney's fees, are availa-
ble to an artist plaintiff.83 The only exception to the title 17 reme-
dies is the omission of criminal sanctions against a defendant who
violates an artist's right of integrity or attribution.
8 4
5. Special Provisions
The Act specifically addresses works of visual art on build-
ings." The statute differentiates between works that are removable
without alteration or destruction and those which cannot be re-
moved.86 The right of integrity is protected unless the building
alteration of a work? While a work created by many artists may present a problem, allowing
one artist to waive the rights of another contradicts the policies behind section 106A.
83. 17 U.S.C. § 502, 504, 505 (1988). See Report, supra note 14, at 22.
84. 17 U.S.C. § 506 states that the criminal sanctions available under copyright do not
apply to the rights conferred by section 106A. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (Supp. 1993).
85. (d)(1) In a case in which-
(A) a work of visual art has been incorporated in or made part of a
building in such a way that removing the work from the building will
cause the destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification of
the work as described in section 106A (a)(3), and
(B) the author consented to the installation of the work in the build-
ing either before the effective date . . . or in a written instrument
. . . that is signed by the owner of the building and the author and
that specifies that installation of the work may be subject to destruc-
tion, distortion, mutilation, or other modification, by reason of its
removal then the rights conferred by paragraphs (2) and (3) of sec-
tion 106A(a) shall not apply.
(2) If the owner of a building wishes to remove a work of visual art which is a
part of such building and which can be removed from the building without the
destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work as de-
scribed in section 106A (3), the author's rights . . . shall apply unless-
(A) the owner made a diligent, good faith attempt without success to
notify the author ... , or
(B) the owner did provide such notice in writing and the person noti-
fied failed, within 90 days after receiving such notice, either to re-
move the work or to pay for its removal.
17 U.S.C. § 113(d) (Supp. 1993). See also Keith A. Attlesey, Comment, The Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990: the Art of Preserving Building Owner's Rights, 22 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REv. 371 (1992) (comparing the California Art Preservation Act to the VARA protection of
visual art incorporated into buildings); Serra v. United States, 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988)
(holding that the removal of a sculpture does not violate the First Amendment). See also
Judith H. Balfe and Margaret J. Wyszomirski, Public Art and Public Policy, 15 J. ARTS
MGMT & LAW 5 (1986).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d). See also Matthew A. Goodin, Comment, The Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990: Further Defining the Rights and Duties of Artists and Real Property
Owners, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 567 (1992) (analyzing the implications of the VARA on
property owners, their liability, and the burdens attached to their rights). Compare CAL.
CIV. CODE § 987 (Deering 1991) with N.Y. ART & CULT. AFF. LAWS § 14.03 (McKinney
19941
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owner and creator make a written agreement recognizing that the
work may be damaged if it is removed. Works that can be removed
from a building without alteration are specifically addressed. If the
owner makes "a diligent good faith attempt without success to no-
tify the author of the owner's intended action," then the owner
would not be liable under section 106A. Similarly, if the owner
does not provide notice in writing to the creator and the creator
does not remove the work or pay for its removal in 90 days, the
owner is not liable.
88
6. Preemption
The VARA preempts various state laws enacted before its pas-
sage.8 9 The VARA provides that "all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the rights conferred by" the VARA are
preempted, and that "no person is entitled to any right or
equivalent right in any work of visual art under the common law or
statutes of any State.""0 Preemption, however, is not effective if
the cause of action arose prior to June 1, 1991.91. It also is not effec-
tive against activities violating legal or equitable rights not
Supp. 1991).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1993).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 1993).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f). The Register of Copyrights in the Library of Congress, Ralph
Oman, stated that "[a] single Federal system is preferable to state statutes or municipal
ordinances. . . because creativity is stimulated more effectively on a uniform, national ba-
sis." Report, supra note 14, at 7, 21.
The California statute was the first state law recognizing moral rights. Cal. Civ. Code
§ 980-990. Enacted in 1979, section 987 of the statute protects "fine art," including paint-
ings, murals, sculptures, drawings, or works of art in glass. Section 987 also protects the
rights of paternity and integrity for the life of the artist and for a period of 50 years after
death. The statute contains a special provision for artwork attached to buildings. See also
Kathryn A. Kelly, Case Summary, Botello v. Shell Oil Co., 2 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.
52 (1992) (discussing Botello v. Shell Oil, applying the California statute to a mural).
Other states also have enacted legislation. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-116t (1991); ILL. ANN STAT. 121 1/2 1401-1408
(Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151-2156 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27,
§ 303 (West Supp. 1990); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch 231 § 85s (Law. Co-op 1991); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN § 598.970-.978 (Michie 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A-1 to -8 (West 1987);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-3 (MICHIE 1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73 § 2102-2108 (Purdon
1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-2 to 5-62-6 (Michie 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-22-
16 (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-2a-9 (1990). See also Jane Engdahl, Moral Rights in State
Statutes: A Comparison of the California Art Preservation Act and the New York Artists'
Authorship Act, 34 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 203 (1987).
90. Id. See also Joseph Zurber, Do Artists Have Moral Rights? 21 J. ART MGMT & L.
284 (1992) (discussing the VARA and its probable preemptive effect in analogous state law
provisions).
91. 17 U.S.C. §301 (f)(1)(A) (Supp. 1993).
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equivalent to the rights of attribution or integrity.9 2 Finally, the
statute is not preemptive if asserted against "activities violating
legal or equitable rights which extend beyond the life of the
author.""3
D. The Implications
In summary, with the recognition of moral rights for visual
artists, the United States has joined countries throughout the
western world in protecting the honor and reputation of the artist,
thus complying with the Berne Convention requirements. Congress
amended applicable copyright laws to include section 106A, the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990. The VARA protects only visual
artists, and protects two of the bundle of rights generally recog-
nized as comprising moral rights: the right of attribution and the
right of integrity. The right of attribution gives the artist the right
to claim authorship to works the artist created. Further, the artist
can disclaim works that are not his or her own, or that have been
so distorted or altered as to no longer be his or her own. The right
of integrity grants the artist the right to prevent any intentional
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of a work that would
be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation. This right further
allows the artist to prevent the destruction of a work if the work is
of a recognized stature.
In recognizing these two rights, although quite limited by the
VARA, the statute may implicate First Amendment concerns. The
First Amendment guarantees that Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech.9 ' The question is whether section
106A abridges the freedom of speech.
The VARA, in granting the artist the rights of attribution and
integrity, does not define clearly what third-party conduct violates
the statute. Instead, the statute merely grants the artist the rights,
with no affirmative language prohibiting the owner or beholder
92. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(B) (Supp. 1993). This vague parameter is susceptible to mul-
tiple interpretations. Perhaps it means that only the parts of state law which are identical to
section 106A are preempted, or that the state statute need not be identical to section 106A
to be preempted.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(C) (Supp. 1993). The issue of preemption raises many
problems concerning state legislation. Because the duration of most state statutes is the life
of the creator plus fifty years, a question is presented as to an artist's rights: does she claim
federal protection during her lifetime and do her heirs claim state protection subsequent to
her death? Another question is whether the definitional limitation of state statues (i.e., fine
art) establishes works protected under section 106A but not under state statutes. See Nim-
mer, supra note 38, § 8.21[B].
94. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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from conduct that would constitute a violation of the artist's
rights. While moral rights are indeed intangible property rights, a
vague prohibition against prejudicing an artist's honor or reputa-
tion leaves an owner or beholder without guidance as to what con-
stitutes such prejudice. The First Amendment is implicated here
because an owner or beholder may be prohibited from engaging in
protected First Amendment speech. The Act could chill speakers
from engaging in expressive speech or acts that might prejudice an
artist's reputation.
The hypotheticals introduced in Part I will help illustrate the
potential conflict. The painting in Hypothetical #1 is a painting of
a semi-nude woman displayed in an exhibit on pornography. This
painting qualifies as visual art under section 101 because it is a
limited edition painting, signed and numbered by the artist. Thus,
section 106A grants the creator of the work the rights of integrity
and attribution. Because the painting is signed by the artist, the
right of attribution presumably is not violated. However, the artist
may claim a violation of his right of integrity if he feels the display
prejudices his reputation and honor. However, the owner has not
physically altered the painting at all, so it is unlikely the artist will
succeed.
The owner of the painting may believe she is merely exercising
her ownership rights. In this situation, the statute clearly requires
the visual art be altered in some way. Further, the statute states
that modifications made as a result of lighting or placement are
not actionable. The artist in this hypothetical is opposed to the
placement of the work amidst adult magazine photos. The creator
in this hypothetical has no cause of action under section 106A. The
First Amendment rights of the owner who chose to display the
work with Penthouse and Playboy photos are protected, as is her
right to label the artist's work pornography. Arguably the artist's
reputation and honor may be affected, but the owner's actions are
protected.
In the second hypothetical, a painting is photographed for an
advertisement. A critic alleges that the painting is a copy of an-
other artist's work, and the critic rips up the advertisement on TV.
Here, the painting itself is protected under the VARA, but the
critic did not alter it at all. Instead, he only destroyed the adver-
tisement containing a reproduction of the work. The advertisement
is not protected under the VARA, so the artist has no cause of
action under section 106A. Further, because the United States
does not recognize the right to prevent excessive criticism, the art-
ist must find an alternative theory in order to pursue a claim, per-
[Vol. 11:211
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haps defamation. The critic practiced his First Amendment rights
by criticizing the work, and engaged in an expressive act by tearing
the ad. Again, the artist's reputation and honor arguably were
prejudiced and the beholder's rights are protected.
The work of visual art in Hypothetical #3 is an original mural
painted onto the side of a building, signed by the artist. It depicts
patriotic themes, and a man protesting American foreign policy
sprays red paint over part of it. At the same time Congress
amended the Copyright Act to include section 106A, section 113
was amended to incorporate visual art that is attached to build-
ings. The VARA protects the mural, granting the rights of attribu-
tion and integrity to the artist. Here, the artist may claim violation
of the right of integrity because the work has been mutilated. The
artist may also claim her right to prevent the use of her name on
her work that has been altered so as to prejudice her. In this case,
the artist is protected, yet the man practicing core political speech
under the First Amendment is liable.
Hypothetical #4 involves a documentary film by a film stu-
dent, purchased by a studio. The studio edits the film and the art-
ist objects. The VARA explicitly excludes motion pictures from its
protection, so the student artist receives no protection under that
statute. Here, the artist believes his reputation and honor are
prejudiced by the studio's "polishing" of his work. The studio exer-
cised its right to prepare a derivative work clearly based upon the
original. This act of editing also incorporated the editor's First
Amendment right of expression.
In addition to these specific hypotheticals, many other exam-
ples evidence a potential clash between moral rights and the First
Amendment. Any physical addition to a protected work, be it tem-
porary or permanent, for political or social reasons, violates section
106A's right of integrity. Further, any choice not to include a crea-
tor's name on or near a work, either to introduce gender equality
into a traditionally male-dominated competition, or to express the
exhibitioner's artistic tastes, violates section 106A's right of
attribution.
As evident from the examples above, all artists are not pro-
tected by the VARA, nor are all visual artists protected. While
each situation presented may prejudice the reputation and honor
of the artist, the statute does not apply uniformly. Further, the
First Amendment rights of the owners and beholders are subject to
the VARA's definition of visual art. With this limitation of the be-
holders' First Amendment rights, the VARA must contend with
challenges to it based on the First Amendment.
19941
23
Kelly: Moral Rights and the First Amendment: Putting Honor Before Free S
Published by Institutional Repository, 1994
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech . .. The First Amendment
was integral to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, guaranteeing
freedoms of speech, association, and religion. Colonial America was
premised on the abhorrence of England's intolerance of these indi-
vidual freedoms.96 Now developed into a substantial body of juris-
prudence, courts evaluate First Amendment defenses carefully.
This section will examine the First Amendment generally, discuss-
ing its purposes and focusing on certain First Amendment doc-
trines. This section will then alayize the interaction between the
First Amendment and moral rights.
A. The Purposes of the First Amendment
Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California9 7 defined the gen-
eral purposes of the First Amendment." Enlightenment is the first
purpose,99 and includes political, social, and scientific "news" as
well as entertainment. Included under this broad umbrella is the
"marketplace of ideas," 100 under which Justice Holmes defined
freedom of expression as the catalyst to the discovery of truth.
Our constitutional jurisprudence mandates access to facts and
data in order for citizens to form their own opinions and make in-
95. Id.
96. While the framers were concerned with eliminating prior restraint, many First
Amendment commentators have put forth varying theories as to the intended scope of the
First Amendment. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 997 (12th ed. 1991).
97. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring).
98. Professor Emerson has established four values of the First Amendment's protec-
tion of expression that are very similar to those enumerated by Justice Brandeis. THOMAS I.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (1966). Each is neces-
sary, but not in itself sufficient, because the elements are interdependent. Emerson lists the
purposes as: assuring individual self-fulfillment; a means of attaining truth; a method of
securing participation by the members of society in social, including political, decision mak-
ing; and "achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable community... maintaining
precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus." Id. See also THOMAS
I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970) (articulating legal foundations
for an effective system of freedom of expression).
99. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
100. "[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissent-
ing). "[Tlhough all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so truth be
in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her
and falsehood grapple; whoever knew truth put to the worst in a free and open encounter?"
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING TO THE
PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644).
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formed choices. The First Amendment bestows a right "of the pub-
lic to receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, moral
and other ideas and experiences." 101 Although an audience has a
right not to listen, a speaker maintains a right to discuss.1
02
The second purpose Brandeis articulated is that of self-fulfill-
ment.103 This idea encompasses the need for human self-expression
in all forms. "The First Amendment serves not only the needs of
the polity but also those of the human spirit--a spirit that de-
mands self-expression. Such expression is an integral part of the
development of ideas and a sense of identity. To suppress expres-
sion is to reject the basic human desire for recognition and affront
the individual's worth and dignity."
1 0
4
The third purpose of the First Amendment as expressed by
Justice Brandeis is that of a safety valve. 05 Society has a need for
free expression as an alternative for social or political violence. 106
In this way, there is an outlet in the freedoms guaranteed by the
First Amendment. "The principle of open discussion is a method
of achieving a more adaptable and at the same time more stable
community, of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy
cleavage and necessary consensus." 'e
Although the First Amendment serves these important func-
tions, not all speech receives the same protection. There are many
viewpoints as to how speech should be classified. For example, Jus-
tice Black believed that the First Amendment was absolute, that
"no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech" meant no law, no
"ifs, or buts or whereases." e8 This absolutist approach has never
been adopted by the Court. Instead, the Court has supported defi-
nitional balancing, achieved by categorizing speech." 9 The degree
101. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (acknowl-
edging that the First Amendment gives the public access to social, political, aesthetic, moral,
and ideas generally). Professor Alexander Meiklejohn defined First Amendment protection
broadly, including "education ... the achievements of philosophy and the sciences ...
literature and the arts." Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute,
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 257 (1961) (emphasis added).
102. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 8.1[A]
(1993); See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985)
(quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)) ("[F]reedom of thought and expres-
sion includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.").
103. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
104. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
105. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375. See also Emerson, supra note 98.
106. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
107. Emerson, supra note 98, at 11.
108. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1951) (Black, J. dissenting).
109. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
1994]
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of protection granted to speech depends on the type of speech and
its content.110 For example, commercial speech and obscenity re-
ceive less protection than political or symbolic speech. Another ap-
proach advocates a case-by-case balancing of competing values."'
However, this so-called ad-hoc balancing approach does not pro-
vide any predictability in the law.
B. The First Amendment and Copyright
With the purposes of the First Amendment in mind, and
before exploring the moral rights implications, this section briefly
examines the issue of the balancing of First Amendment and copy-
right law generally. Any law regulating speech must not
subordinate the First Amendment, and the Copyright Act is no
exception.
During the 1970s, defendants in infringement actions asserted
their First Amendment rights in their defense. 2 Although these
cases failed to sway the courts, many commentators advocated an
explicit First Amendment defense in infringement actions.113 The
Supreme Court in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
terprises"" addressed the defense, effectively closing the door on
the debate over the First Amendment.
In Nation, the defendant published 300 words of the 20,000-
word memoirs of President Gerald Ford before the plaintiff's licen-
see could publish them.11 5 The Court held that the memoirs consti-
tuted news, and that the public was entitled to access. After con-
sideration, the Court rejected both the Fair Use and the First
Amendment defenses.
In view of the First Amendment protection already embod-
ied in the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable ex-
pression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude
for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use,
we see no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use to cre-
(1980) (stating that commercial speech is protected, yet .not as fully as political speech);
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942) (categorizing "fighting words" as outside First Amendment protection).
110. See McCarthy supra note 102, at § 8.2[A].
111. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
112. See Goldstein, supra note 28, § 10.3 n.2.
113. Id. nn.5-6. "Reconciliation of copyright with the First Amendment requires the
striking of a . . . balance between the property interest of the copyright holder and the
public interest." Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
983, 991 (1970).
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ate what amounts to a public figure exception to copyright.11
1. Fair Use
The Nation Court, reviewing the Fair Use defense to decide
the case, explored one of two major protections of the First
Amendment built into the Copyright Act. 117 The judicially created
doctrine of Fair Use is a defense to an infringement suit, permit-
ting persons, without consent of the copyright owner, to use the
work, usually for social, political and cultural benefits." 8 Section
107 codifies four factors applied to determine whether a use is fair:
(1) the purpose and character of the use;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work. 119
Though not exclusive, courts apply these factors to decide if
the defendant should be immune from liability. Fair Use promotes
First Amendment goals, but is not a First Amendment exception
to the Copyright Act. 1
20
2. Idea/Expression Dichotomy
The second protection for the First Amendment incorporated
into the Copyright Act is the idea/expression dichotomy. The stat-
ute protects an author's expression of ideas, not the ideas them-
selves.' In this way, the statute balances the interests of the crea-
tor while maintaining a source of information for the public and
other creators. Professor Nimmer observed that this dichotomy
"represents an acceptable definitional balance between copyright
116. Id. at 560.
117. For an excellent essay arguing against copyright suppression of the First Amend-
ment, see Floyd Abrams, Copyright Shouldn't Set Aside Values of First Amendment, LE-
GAL TIMES, Dec. 28, 1987, at 29.
118. See Goldstein, supra note 28, § 10.2.1; Memorandum from Prosdauer Rose Goetz
& Mendelsohn to the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Preserving the Genius of the System: A Critical Examination
of Moral Rights Into United States Law (Sept. 20, 1989) (on file with author). Criticism and
comment, teaching, news reporting, and parody are purposes behind the Fair Use doctrine.
Goldstein, supra note 28, § 10.2.1.
119. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
120. See supra notes 97-111 and accompanying text (enumerating the purposes of the
First Amendment).
121. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
1994]
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and free speech interests.' 1 22
Other protections for the First Amendment built into the
Copyright statute include the limited duration of protection and
the exclusion of facts from copyrightable subject matter. These
two concepts, along with Fair Use and the idea/expression distinc-
tion, balance the First Amendment and copyright.
12
1
C. Selected First Amendment Provisions
In addition to the Copyright Act's balancing of First Amend-
ment concerns, other doctrines will be employed to analyze the
VARA's relationship with the First Amendment. After these se-
lected doctrines have been reviewed, the conflict between the First
Amendment and moral rights will be addressed once again.
1. Strict Scrutiny
At the core of the First Amendment protection of freedom of
speech is political speech. Because our government is "by, of and
for the people," the people have a right to participate in govern-
ment. The public is entitled to receive information, as well as to
debate their differing viewpoints. 1 2  The Supreme Court has recog-
nized explicitly that the First Amendment protects both speech
and thought, even if it is offensive to society.'25
In order for an individual's political speech to be restrained,
the government must overcome the heavy burden of strict scru-
tiny.1 26 First, the government must articulate a compelling interest.
122. Nimmer, supra note 38, § 1.10[B].
123. See also Lionel Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?
19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43 (1971) (arguing against any First Amendment exception
to copyright); Melville D. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guaran-
tee of Free Speech and Press? 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180 (1970) (concluding that the public
interest should overpower the right of the proprietor); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the
First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970) (calling for an explicit First Amendment
exception).
124. See supra notes 92-111 and accompanying text.
125. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) ("[A]t the heart of
the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will,
and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience
rather than coerced by the State."); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is
a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.").
126. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); JOHN E. NOWAK
& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTTuTIoNAL LAW §§ 11.5 - 11.7 (1990). See also Gitlow v. New
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Next, the regulation by the government must be narrowly tailored
to achieve the substantial interest. Finally, there must not be any
less restrictive means of achieving the governmental goal.
12 7
2. Expressive Conduct (Speech Plus)
Freedom of speech is not limited to the written or spoken
word. 28 Rather, it encompasses a much broader range of expres-
sion. Speech can be combined with non-speech elements and still
maintain its protection.2 9 However, not all speech which includes
an expressive component will be protected. The Supreme Court in
United States v. O'Brien'5 0 created a test to determine whether
speech combined with action is protected under the First
Amendment.
The defendant in O'Brien burned his draft notice on the steps
of the South Boston Courthouse. He was found guilty of violating
the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948.13' O'Brien
challenged the statute's constitutionality because it restricted his
freedom of expression.132 The Court would not accept O'Brien's
First Amendment argument as a complete defense, refusing to "ac-
cept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can
be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends thereby to express an idea."'' s However, the Court ac-
knowledged that O'Brien's actions were not wholly outside the
First Amendment.' 3 The Court presumed that his actions con-
tained sufficient communicative aspects to invoke the First
127. Nowak, supra note 127 § 14.3.
128. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (recognizing that speech may be
nonverbal); West Virginia State Bd v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ("no official ...can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein"); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131 (1966) (where Justice Fortas stated that First Amendment rights "are not confined to
verbal expression [but] embrace appropriate types of action which certainly include the
right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest").
129. The Supreme Court has recognized that certain types of non-verbal conduct
which communicate an idea or belief are protected under the First Amendment. Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974). See also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
130. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
131. The statute made it an offense for a person who "forges, alters, knowingly de-
stroys, knowingly mutilates" or changes a certificate. Id. at 370 (citing § 462(b)).
132. Id. at 370.
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Amendment.'35
In concluding that the First Amendment was called into ques-
tion, the Court established a four-part test to determine whether a
government interest justifies First Amendment restrictions. First,
the regulation must fall within the constitutional power of the gov-
ernment. 36 Second, the regulation must further an important or
substantial governmental interest. 137 Third, the regulation must be
unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 8" Finally, the re-
striction must be no greater than is essential to further the govern-
mental goal.' 39
Other cases employ the O'Brien test to determine whether free
speech has been infringed."'0 For example, flag burning cases util-
ize the O'Brien test. In Spence v. Washington,"' a student affixed
a peace symbol made of tape to an American flag, protesting the
Kent State killings. The state arrested him for improper flag use,
and convicted him.14 2 The Court, in reversing the conviction, modi-
fied the O'Brien test and articulated a two-prong test for symbolic
speech. First, the court must determine whether the conduct clas-
sifies as speech under the First Amendment."' s The court makes
this determination by examining whether there is the intent to
convey a specific message, and if there is a great likelihood the
message will be understood by onlookers.""' Second, the court must
determine whether the state's interests are of such a substantial
nature that they justify infringing the individual's First Amend-
135. Id.
136. Id. at 377.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. In O'Brien's case, the regulation passed the test. First, the Constitution vests
the power to raise and support armies in the government. Id. Next, the Selective Service
certificate fulfilled several governmental goals, including those of quick notification and
rapid induction in the time of national crisis. Id. at 378-81. Third, these interests were unre-
lated to the suppression of free speech. Rather, they related to supporting a national de-
fense. Id. at 380-81. Finally, the Court held that the restriction was sufficiently narrow to
meet its goals. Id. at 382.
140. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 292 U.S. 503 (1969).
141. 418 U.S. 405 (1974). See also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
142. Spence, 418 U.S. at 406-07.
143. Id. at 409.
144. Id. at 410. The Court found that Spence's actions were protected under the First
Amendment and would be understood by those viewing his conduct. The analysis under
Spence diverges from O'Brien and seems to create a test focused on the factual context of
the speech to determine its status. James R. Dyer, Comment, Texas v. Johnson: Symbolic
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ment rights. In this case, the Court also relied on the fact that the
flag was privately owned by the defendant, resulting in no state
interest in its preservation. 1 5
3. Prior Restraint
Until 1695, writers in England had to have their works li-
censed before publication.'" This practice of licensing is known as
prior restraint,4 7 and is considered the most drastic infringement
on free speech. Considered more severe than subsequent punish-
ment, it is still at the core of First Amendment jurisprudence. 
1 8
Rather than being based upon an established licensing system,
prior restraint now results from court injunctions imposed before
publication of speech. "Any prior restraint on expression comes to
• .. [the] Court with a heavy presumption against its constitu-
tional validity.'1
4 9
Injunctions are one of the remedies available to artists under
the Copyright Act. 50 Although injunctions may be granted before
or after the allegedly infringing work is published, preliminary in-
junctions are common.' 5' A court, in determining the merits of the
case before granting an injunction, may prohibit publication
completely.
52
4. Overbreadth & Vagueness
An overbroad statute not only affects activities that are not
145. Spence, 418 U.S. at 415. This argument could apply to moral rights. However, the
public's interest in works of art is one of the purposes of the VARA articulated by Congress.
146. Nowak, supra note 126, § 16.16. The English Licensing Act of 1662 required offi-
cial licensing for all printed publications.
147. See William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunc-
tions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1982); Thomas Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955).
148. Nowak, supra note 127, § 16.16. See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
149. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Organization for
a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). See also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). Interestingly, several leading commentators argue that the role of
prior restraint in current First Amendment jurisprudence is unclear. See Martin H. Redish,
The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L.
REV. 53 (1984); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409
(1983).
150. See Tiffany D. Trunko, Remedies for Copyright Infringement: Respecting the
First Amendment, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1940 (1989).
151. Uneeda Doll Co. v. Goldfarb Novelty Co, 373 F.2d 851, 852 n.1 (2d Cir.), cert.
dism'd, 389 U.S. 801 (1967).
152. Nimmer, supra note 38, § 14.06[B].
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constitutionally protected but also affects protected activity.153
The overbreadth doctrine protects speech from being chilled by
the threat of punishment,15  and guards against statutes suscepti-
ble to arbitrary and selective enforcement by government officials.
Uniquely, the overbreadth doctrine is the only constitutional chal-
lenge that grants an individual defendant standing by allowing the
defendant to point to the unconstitutional effect of the statute on
another individual's rights.
155
A related doctrine, vagueness, voids a statute that forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that a person of
common intelligence must guess at its meaning."5 A vague statute
regulating speech gives the speaker no notice of what is prohibited
speech. 157 Law enforcement officers and potential plaintiffs then
have the difficulty of determining, in their own discretion, what is
violative of the statute. Vague statutes operate to inhibit the exer-
cise of First Amendment freedoms. 58 Overbreadth and vagueness,
while related, are separate and distinct challenges to statutes vio-
lating the First Amendment.
IV. THE CONFLICT ANALYZED
With moral rights and First Amendment doctrines explored,
the potential constitutional clash between the two must be ad-
dressed. This potential conflict has not been dealt with in the
courts or Congress, as no plaintiff has asserted this argument, and
the legislative history of the VARA does not address the infringe-
ment of First Amendment freedoms by the Act. 59 The Constitu-
153. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The First Amendment Rule Against Overbreadth, 52 TEMP.
L.Q. 259 (1979).
154. Id. at 259. Justice Thurgood Marshall stated that an overbroad statute "hangs
over [a person's] head like a Sword of Damocles. . . . That this Court will ultimately vindi-
cate [a person] if his [or her] speech is constitutionally protected is of little consequence -
for the value of a sword of Damocles is that it hangs - not that it drops." Arnett v. Ken-
nedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
155. Gunther, supra note 96, at 1200. If the statute "is readily subject to a narrowing
construction by the state court," an overbreadth attack will not succeed. Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 55 (1976). See also Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for
Jesus, 482 U.S. 569 (1987); Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
156. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
157. This violates the Due Process Clause's notice requirement. Gunther, supra note
96, at 1202. "Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning." Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
158. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
159. Chief Minority Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology
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tion clearly gives Congress the power to legislate in the area of
copyright and moral rights.1"' By enacting the VARA, Congress ex-
ercised those rights.
When an idea or opinion is communicated to others, the po-
tential conflict between the First Amendment and other interests
becomes more acute. 161 First Amendment jurisprudence has long
been concerned with reconciling freedom of expression with the
right to protection against unfair damage to reputation.1 6 2 The
VARA brings this question into direct scrutiny. The First Amend-
ment doctrines laid out above may guide this inquiry. As noted,
any statute violating the First Amendment faces a heavy presump-
tion against its validity. If this potential clash is indeed a reality,
the outlook for moral rights may be dim.
A. Usefulness of Copyright Defenses
While copyright law balances First Amendment concerns by
incorporating the Fair Use defense and the idea/expression dichot-
omy, these doctrines do not apply to moral rights very effectively.
The rights given by section 106A are subject to the Fair Use de-
fense. However, the House Report states that it is unlikely that
such a defense will be successful. 13 Professor Damich notes that
there is no application of the Fair Use defense to the two rights
protected. The rights apply to irreplaceable works, for the most
part,1 64 and destruction or physical alteration of a work can hardly
be Fair Use when the objective of the user could be accomplished
by destroying or altering a reproduction. 6 5
The Fair Use factors themselves militate against recognition of
the Fair Use defense for moral rights. First, the purpose and char-
acter of the use is to alter or destroy the work. Clearly the statute
prohibits these actions.' Second, the nature of the copyrighted
and the Law George Smith argues that section 106A raises free speech issues "rich with
irony." George Smith, Let the Buyer of Art Beware, THE RECORDER, June 10, 1991, at 4.
Smith points to the rejection of a flag desecration amendment to support his argument
against section 106A. "By the same token, the artists law makes it illegal for the owner to
mutilate or disfigure a painting to express a political message.. . . The bizarre irony of this
legislative handiwork was entirely lost on the members of the 101st Congress." Id.
160. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
161. Emerson, supra note 98, at 66.
162. Id. at 68.
163. ALEXANDER LINDEY, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS
§ 9.07[1][a] (1992) (quoting the House Report on H.R. 2690).
164. Notwithstanding limited edition originals.
165. Damich, supra note 28, at 986.
166. As noted above, however, the statute is unclear as to what specifically would con-
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work is defined by section 101 of the Copyright Act, limiting pro-
tection to visual arts that meet the statute's criteria. By definition,
the works protected are original works in single or limited editions.
Allowing destruction or alteration would quash the statute's pur-
pose of protecting such works. Third, the amount of the work used
seems irrelevant because any alteration to a work, no matter how
small, could prejudice the creator's reputation. Finally, the effect
on the potential market, arguably the most important factor, dic-
tates that the First Amendment doctrine is inapplicable to moral
rights. A work altered would likely not be marketable unless a
buyer found the alterations enhanced the work.
It is unlikely that a court would reason that the Fair Use de-
fense would permit the alteration or destruction of a work when
the statute's very purpose is to protect the work. Also, any use of a
protected work that would damage the creator's reputation or
honor cannot be called fair. Therefore, one of the First Amend-
ment protections built into the Copyright Act does apply to moral
rights.
Similarly, the idea/expression dichotomy does not apply to
moral rights. The distinction between ideas, which are not pro-
tected, and expression, which is protected, does not find a basis in
moral rights law. Each work of visual art is a unique expression,
and therefore all such works would be protected as expression if
the copyright's parameters applied to visual art. This dichotomy
does not serve to protect the public's First Amendment rights as it
does in copyright.
The two protections for the First Amendment in copyright law
do not apply to moral rights. Because there is no inherent protec-
tion of the First Amendment in section 106A, the statute may be
more susceptible to attack. To make this determination, this arti-
cle will next apply First Amendment doctrines to analyze section
106A's constitutionality.
B. Strict Scrutiny
According to Professor Merryman, traditional droit moral
does not prevent fair comment and criticism. Rather, it merely al-
lows the public the opportunity to see a work as the creator
wanted to show it. 167 While this generally may be true of moral
rights, the First Amendment is a fundamental right that must not
stitute prejudice to the honor or reputation of the artist.
167. Merryman, supra note 16.
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be abridged by Congress. The glitch in this reasoning is that the
Constitution also provides the Copyright Clause, and thus, rights
are in conflict. Without detailed analysis, the solution may be de-
termined by the positions these rights enjoy. The First Amend-
ment occupies a "preferred position, ' 168 receiving preferential
treatment by courts. Further, as a fundamental right of the Bill of
Rights, the First Amendment arguably trumps the lesser goal of
Congress to promote the useful arts.
This inquiry can also be resolved by applying strict scrutiny to
a regulation to determine if the statute violates the First Amend-
ment. 69 The test itself examines' the government interest, im-
pliedly balancing it with other rights. Because most violations of
section 106A involve conduct, the O'Brien test would be applied.
The next section explores this application. However, the Court
may change its view and determine that conduct so closely aligned
with First Amendment expression necessitates the use of strict
scrutiny.
The government must first articulate a compelling interest in
limiting speech. Arguably, the determination by Congress that vis-
ual artists' honor and reputation are compelling could satisfy this
prong. However, this argument is belied by section 106A's narrow
scope: if these concerns were so important, the rights would apply
to all artists who satisfy the statute's criteria, not solely visual art-
ists, and would apply to all works of art, not just-those that satisfy
106A's limited scope.
Second, the regulation must be narrowly tailored to meet the
interest. Again, section 106A fails the prong, because while the
statute is narrow, the objective of protecting artists' reputations is
not. The statute does not protect all visual artists, let alone artists
in general. Also, if the interest in artists' reputations was so impor-
tant, Congress would have extended standing to other groups and
would have given perpetual protection to moral rights (or at least
for a period after the artist's death). To satisfy strict scrutiny, the
statute must not be over- or underinclusive. As pointed out
above,1 70 the statute does not protect all artists and does not pro-
tect all visual artists uniformly. It also may override legitimate
First Amendment rights, thus nearing overinclusiveness. In assert-
ing the importance of an artist's honor and reputation, the statute
fails to protect them.
168. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
169. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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If a court rejects the arguments in the first two prongs, the
court will apply the third prong of the test, requiring that no less
restrictive means of achieving the government's goal exists. It is
difficult to articulate any variation of the statute that potentially
would not infringe upon the First Amendment protection. How-
ever, the statute's grant of rights to the artist does not articulate
specific actions that would violate an artist's rights. The applica-
tion of strict scrutiny to section 106A is thus far theoretical, but in
any such case, the court would struggle with the test.
C. Expressive Conduct
Hypothetical #3, the only one in which section 106A protects
the artist, involves expressive conduct. The O'Brien test deter-
mines whether the First Amendment is violated by the regulation
of speech."' First, the regulation must fall within the constitu-
tional power of government. The Copyright Clause of Article I and
the treaty power of the Senate1 7 2 clearly satisfy this prong. Second,
the regulation must further an important or substantial govern-
mental interest.1 73 As discussed immediately above, this is prob-
lematic because Congress determined only visual artists would be
protected. If the reputation and honor of artists is an important
interest, all artists would be protected under the statute. In any
event, the statute furthers the important government interest of
protecting visual artists.
Next, the regulation must be unrelated to the suppression of
free speech. It seems that in protecting the honor and reputation
of artists, the free speech rights of others who would harm that
reputation are implicated. However, the articulated interest, on its
face, does not suppress free expression. A court likely would find
this prong satisfied. Finally, the restriction must be no greater
than necessary. Again, should a court reach this prong, the statute
is unclear as to what conduct is prohibited.1 7' Therefore, the regu-
171. See supra notes 128-45 and accompanying text.
172. Berne Convention compliance arguably dictates moral rights protection.
173. This seems to lessen strict scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny.
174. Using the alternative test articulated by the Spence Court, the result further im-
plicates the First Amendment. See supra notes 129, 142-44 and accompanying text. First,
the court must determine whether the conduct qualifies as speech under the First Amend-
ment. The person certainly had the intent to convey a specific message. Whether the mes-
sage would be understood by those who viewed his action depends on what he painted onto
the mural, what he said as he did so, or any other indication that he was protesting Ameri-
can policy in the Middle East. Second, the court must determine that the interest is so
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lation's scope is not readily determined, so lesser restrictions are
difficult to imagine. Further, the hypothetical may be complicated
by the person's speech in this situation. The person's political
speech is at the core of the First Amendment, but section 106A
may restrict it. A court applying the O'Brien test arguably could
find the regulation is unconstitutional as applied to him or her.
A hypothetical based on Spence175 may complicate the conflict
even further. If Spence had affixed the peace symbol to a painting
fitting the visual art definition, he would have violated section
106A. The symbol was temporary, and part of core political speech,
but the statute would have dictated that he had infringed the art-
ist's moral rights. Perhaps an additional requirement of perma-
nency to the destruction portion of the right of integrity would
grant some protection to the First Amendment.
176
D. Prior Restraint
Section 106A may violate the prohibition against prior re-
straint. Given the heavy presumption against prior restraint, if a
beholder were to be enjoined before exercising his First Amend-
ment rights, the statute could be struck down.
For example, where administrators in a juried art competition
choose not to attribute works to their creators, such action argua-
bly violates the artist's right of attribution. An artist who reads the
competition's rules and decides not to enter the competition may
be able to enjoin this violation. It seems unlikely that the heavy
presumption against such prior restraint of the administrator's ac-
tions could be overcome by an artist's right to be acknowledged as
creator.
E. Overbreadth & Vagueness
Other challenges to section 106A under the First Amendment
are overbreadth and vagueness. 177 Section 106A may punish viola-
tions of the right of integrity or attribution, but as shown by the
hypotheticals, legitimate First Amendment activity also may be
punished. The man who defaced the mural in Hypothetical #3 vio-
lated section 106A, and is liable thereunder. However, core First
Amendment speech is at issue; the existence of section 106A chills
175. See supra notes 129, 142-44 and accompanying text.
176. However, temporary alteration may prejudice the reputation and honor of the
artist. The statute is not clear as to what constitutes such prejudice.
177. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
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speech. Because of the broad standing provision of overbreadth, as
long as a defendant could articulate one individual whose First
Amendment rights are undermined by section 106A, the statute is
overbroad. One option is for a court to narrow the statute to cure
its overbreadth, but as Congress has stated repeatedly, the VARA
is very narrow in its scope. Because prohibited actions are unclear,
a court could not narrow the statute.
As discussed above, section 106A does not clearly state what
activities violate the statute. Persons could differ as to what vio-
lates an artist's reputation or honor. The statute also gives a judge
unguided discretion to determine whether a destroyed work is of
"recognized stature.' 78
F. A Solution?
The arguments above point out the conflict between First
Amendment and moral rights. While some arguments may be
stronger than others, the conflict is certainly possible. As one wit-
ness before Congress stated, "there will be substantial pressure for
the courts to expand the moral rights once recognized. ' 17 There-
fore, the arguments may apply to the right of withdrawal, the right
to prevent excessive criticism or other moral rights. In the case of
excessive criticism, strict scrutiny may indeed trump moral rights
protection.180
Interestingly, the purposes that Justice Brandeis articulated in
Whitney apply on both sides of this argument. In the marketplace
of ideas, enlightenment can be fostered by an artist's contribution
of visual art. However, the expression of others also contributes to
the search for truth.'8 ' Self-fulfillment also is furthered by encour-
aging artists to create and express themselves. 82 Similarly, behold-
ers are entitled to express themselves. Finally, as an alternative to
political or social violence, free expression serves the artist by
functioning as an outlet, and serves the beholders by fostering a
178. Expert testimony on this point would be as subjective as artists choose to be.
179. Nimmer, supra note 38, § 8.21[A]. Hypothetical #4 involves a motion picture,
currently excluded from moral rights protection under the VARA. Should the prediction
come to pass that a little protection will lead to more, the film student.may indeed have a
cause of action against the studio. Similarly, the colorization debate discussed in an earlier
footnote would be moot if motion pictures were protected by the moral rights statute. See
supra note 49.
180. Most criticism is in the form of words, be it written or oral, so the lesser O'Brien
test's analysis would be replaced by strict scrutiny.
181. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
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stable community that engages in healthy cleavage without
violence.
183
The conclusion to be drawn from this article's discussion of
the conflict is one of awareness. Congress enacted the VARA, but
never explored the First Amendment implications. While it is un-
likely that a court would completely void section 106A, First
Amendment rights must be addressed. The total elimination of
section 106A contradicts the important societal interests it pro-
tects. As noted above, narrowing the statute is difficult, if not im-
possible, to accomplish while still protecting its purposes.
Therefore, perhaps courts should address First Amendment
defenses to section 106A just as they do in any other case: by em-
ploying definitional balancing. A court should assess the First
Amendment protection given to the type of speech at issue in the
case. As shown with hypothetical #3, expressive conduct, or speech
combined with action, is judged by using the O'Brien test. Viola-
tions of the right of attribution or integrity, engaged in for com-
mercial purposes, would be analyzed under Central Hudson and
such cases. Because certain types of speech receive little or no First
Amendment protection, section 106A would triumph. In other
cases, section 106A would yield to the First Amendment.
Finally, the issue of remedies is important to the First Amend-
ment inquiry. The First Amendment defense, in cases where defi-
nitional balancing dictates it, may be only partial. Perhaps the be-
holder would be held liable, but could not be asked to pay for the
exercise of a constitutional right. However, people must take re-
sponsibility for their actions, and moral rights are societal inter-
ests. The defendant may thus be required to pay only the market
value of the work. While this proposed solution is not perfect, the
First Amendment is protected.
V. CONCLUSION
The conflict between moral rights jurisprudence and the First
Amendment is not easily resolved. When rights are in conflict, they
must be balanced in order to determine the outcome. In recogniz-
ing the rights of integrity and attribution, Congress did not con-
sider the potential First Amendment implications of the VARA.
Discussion on the potential clash of rights virtually was
nonexistent.
Although the VARA protects only a narrow group of visual
183. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
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artists, First Amendment concerns are raised. Should the United
States enact further legislation expanding moral rights for the art-
ist, these First Amendment concerns would escalate. Ultimately,
courts will determine the implications of moral rights recognition
in the United States. Time will tell whether a beholder will ques-
tion the constitutionality of a statute that impinges upon his or her
free speech.
As the quotes from Ruskin and Milton that introduce this ar-
ticle indicate,184 the dichotomy between the artist's personal feel-
ings and the beholder's right to expression is hard to balance. This
article proposes one vehicle by which to alleviate the potential con-
flict: definitional balancing. Perhaps courts will develop other doc-
trines to balance the competing yet complimentary rights. While
freedom of speech is not absolute, this freedom, which is essential
to our government, should not be overcome by the rights of an art-
ist to his or her reputation or honor.
184. See supra notes 1 and 2 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 11:211
40
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 2
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol11/iss2/2
